Community action and tiger conservation: Assessing the role of social capital

1. Archi Rastogi* ± #
2. Sneha Thapiyal*
3. Gordon M Hickey*

*Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill University, Canada
± Wildlife Institute of India, India
# Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
^Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute of Management Banglore, Banglore, India
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- Social capital
- Study area
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- Results
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Introduction
Introduction

Biodiversity Conservation (Tigers)

Negative Feedback, Extinction of Tigers

Conflict, Management Issues, Political Issue

Large Protected Areas, Exclusively Managed
Social capital

- “Networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1993)
- Networks, flow of information, trust, reciprocity and shared norms
Social capital and tiger conservation?

- Effective partnerships (Kawanishi and Seidensticker 2010)
- Support for management (Rastogi et al. 2012)
- Control poaching (Project Tiger 2005)
- Reduction in ‘revenge killing’ (Damania et al. 2003)
- Political support (Chhatre and Saberwal 2005)
- Political challenges (Chhatre and Saberwal 2005; Saberwal 1996)
- Collective non-cooperation or retaliation (Mukherjee 2009)
- Incendiary action (Damania et al. 2003)
- Cooperation in poaching?
Social capital is key!
Study Area: Corbett Tiger Reserve, India

Globally important tiger population
Corbett Tiger Reserve
Corbett Tiger Reserve
Methods: social capital

- Village level data: interviews
- Household level: questionnaires
  - Social Capital Assessment Tool (SCAT)
  - Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ)
- Qualitative component: interviews
Methods: Questionnaire

1. Demographic Profile
2. Structural Social Capital
   - Exclusions
   - Collective action
   - Organizational density
   - Networks and mutual support
   - Conflict resolution
3. Cognitive Social Capital
   - Solidarity
   - Reciprocity and cooperation
   - Trust
Methods

- Locally adapted
- Control for respondent’s and household characteristics
- Analysis: ordered logit regression; likelihood of going from ‘low’ collective action to ‘high’ collective action
## Results

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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Coding for components of social capital: 1- no one or affected parties; 2 - village leaders; 3 - the whole village.

Partial Proportional Odds Ordered Logit Models for components of social capital in the villages.
Results: qualitative

- Intense tourism → Rise in price of land → financial disparity

- Loss of solidarity and trust (forthcoming)
Discussion: Implications for tiger conservation

- Social capital facilitates collective action
- Direction of action may vary
- Community action is key
Discussion: components of social capital

- Both structural and cognitive
- Possible to engineer: networks and leadership
- Inherent: solidarity
Discussion: social capital undermined?

- Tourism as a resource? Transforms village, reduces social capital

- Inequity in distributing benefits
Conclusion

- Complex, multilayered institutions needed
- Social capital is a resource, not a challenge!
Conclusion

- Complex challenges
- Pragmatic solutions
- Who Killed the Tiger?
  Tuesday, Assembly Hall A, 15:30
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Thank you