Evaluating governance processes in the sharing of revenues from wildlife tourism and hunting in Ethiopia

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Background

• Conservation has moved from a ‘fortress’ to a ‘win-win’ approach

• Rationale: local communities will support protected areas if they receive benefits → revenue sharing

• Most studies on revenue sharing have focused on impacts – little research on processes

• How do institutional design and implementation practice influence effectiveness of revenue sharing schemes?
Study region

- South Omo Zone, Ethiopia
- Protected Areas: Mago National Park, Murulle Controlled Hunting Area, ...
- Habitat: semi-arid savanna
- Livelihoods: mainly (agro)pastoralist
- Revenue sharing implemented since 2007: 6 districts, 24 communities, 0.4 million EUR
- Legislation due to be revised – window of opportunity
Data collection

1. Study of legal documents → exploratory interviews (n=7)
   Interview guideline to evaluate scheme

2. Semi-structured interviews (n=26) with:
   (i) Government representatives: regional, zonal, Woreda
   (ii) Members of the communities involved
   (iii) Protected Area managers
   To identify problems and their causes

3. 1\textsuperscript{st} workshop (n=51), participants from same groups
   To develop solutions

4. 2\textsuperscript{nd} workshop (n=25) with regional government and protected area managers
Data analysis

• Grounded approach: starting from empirical data, qualitative
• Iterative process of collection and analysis
• Four main themes emerged:
  – Information and communication insufficient
  – Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders imbalanced
  – Accountability compromised
  – Characteristics of revenue disbursement
Results: Background

- Revenue sharing scheme institutionalised through regulation and directive
- Only implemented in one zone, South Omo
- Revenue from Protected Areas, e.g.:
  - Entrance fees
  - Photography fees
  - Hunting fees
- Collected in account held by region
- Disbursed by region
- Community share administrated by districts
Revenue disbursement

- Limited revenue
  - Rotation scheme (but unsystematic)
  - Only few communities have so far received

- Specificity of revenue
  - Disbursed to PAs combined with regular annual budget
  - Source of money unclear to communities
Actors: roles and responsibilities

- **Region**: collection, disbursement, monitoring and evaluation
- **Zone**: supposedly monitoring district work
- **District**: implements district *and* community projects
- **Community**: none (supposedly developing project proposals)
- **Protected areas**: collection of revenue, but own share ‘lost’ in overall annual budget
### Actors: roles and responsibilities II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>PA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design of legislation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA management planning</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue collection</td>
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<td>Zero</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Zero</td>
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<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Zero</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weight of the *de facto* role of actors in different components of the revenue sharing scheme

→ Very imbalanced roles: communities passive; region and district very powerful.
Information and communication

Communication between actors (thicker lines: more frequent communication)
Accountability

• Strong top-down structure from region to community, but no feedback in reverse direction, and no monitoring of project success and consequences

• District not answerable to anybody:
  – two distinct reporting lines (political vs topic-related officers)
  – no representation of regional bureau responsible for revenue sharing at the district level
What next?

• Strategies developed in workshops to address shortcomings
  – Revision of regulation and directive
  – Improving implementation: best practice guidelines, enforcement, monitoring
  – Increasing revenue: diversify sources, improving quality

• First progress:
  – Creation of bureaus at district level, accountable to region
  – Incorporation of wildlife issues in rural extension programme run by the region
Conclusions

• Success of the scheme currently compromised by limited revenue, accountability, and imbalanced responsibilities
  – Similar ‘success’ factors found in co-management literature (e.g., Olsson et al. 2004)
  – Will now be used to interpret findings further
• Community capacity for revenue management so far neglected
• Region is dedicated to continuous improvement of the scheme!
• Is revenue sharing sufficient?
Revenue sharing as a win-win approach?

- Communities might receive money, but are not involved in resource management
- Win-win discourse, but in fact modern fortress conservation (Benjaminsen & Svarstad 2010)?
- Does this matter? Is this desired?
- Co-management (Carlsson & Berkes 2005) a useful approach?
- But: major impacts on wildlife conservation through large-scale agricultural investments
- Is current tourism sufficient to make conservation competitive?
Thank you.